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Editors’Summary
The brookings panel on Economic Activity held its seventy-ﬁfth
conference in Washington, D.C., on March 27 and 28, 2003. This issue of
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity includes the papers and discus-
sions presented at the conference. The ﬁrst paper explores why some
emerging market economies are prone to fall into ﬁnancial crisis at levels
of external indebtedness that more advanced economies, and even some
other developing economies, seem able to manage. The second paper
reviews the current U.S. ﬁscal situation against the historical record and
ﬁnds the present is so different that the past is an unreliable guide to how
either the economy or future policy will respond. The third paper offers a
theoretical analysis of optimal monetary policy in the face of a liquidity
trap, with a focus on the importance of expectations. The fourth paper dis-
cusses a new methodological approach to economic policymaking under
uncertainty, with particular attention to uncertainty about economic mod-
els. The concluding report analyzes whether new rules for corporate
pension accounting promulgated in the 1980s misled investors into over-
valuing the stocks of ﬁrms with pension plans during the 1990s market
boom.
Developing economies have been vulnerable to ﬁnancial crises for a
long time and under a wide range of exchange rate regimes and interna-
tional ﬁnancial structures. Although economists have used theoretical
models to explore the link between a country’s external debt and its vul-
nerability to crisis, little empirical work has been done to quantify that
link or to identify what makes some countries more vulnerable than oth-
ers. In the ﬁrst paper of this volume, Carmen Reinhart, Kenneth Rogoff,
and Miguel Savastano draw on the experience of a large number of coun-
tries at different stages of development to address these issues. Their per-
spective is informed by a number of observations about individual
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access to international capital markets irrespective of their debt burdens.
The poorest countries, by contrast, are simply shut out of these markets.
The large group of middle-income countries ﬁnd that their access varies
with their economic situation. The authors introduce the concept of “debt
intolerance” to describe the fact that some countries are more likely than
others to get into financial trouble from taking on a given amount of
debt. They also attempt to quantify debt intolerance and the factors that
lead to it. 
Sovereign defaults have a long history. The authors record sixteen
defaults by European nations between 1501 and 1800, a period for which
data are probably incomplete, and no fewer than thirty European defaults
in the nineteenth century. Focusing on present-day emerging market
economies, they show a close association between a country’s recent
Institutional Investor rating (IIR), which reﬂects the views of economists
and analysts from the ﬁnancial community about a country’s creditwor-
thiness, and its long-term record with respect to default or debt restructur-
ing. (Calculations of country risk based on market yield spreads give
rankings similar to the IIR, but data on yields for many countries’ debt are
available only for recent years.) Focusing on a sample of emerging market
economies, and using data that go back at least a few decades and to 1824
for most, the authors show that those with at least one external default or
restructuring had an average IIR of 42 in 2002, whereas those with no his-
tory of default had an average rating of 62 that year. By comparison, the
ratings of six advanced economies with no history of default average 89.
The authors also show a large difference in inﬂation experience across
these groups. Countries in the lowest IIR category in 2002 spent, on aver-
age, one quarter of the past forty-two years with annual inﬂation exceed-
ing 40 percent. The authors note that most of the countries with some
history of default are “serial defaulters.” Most have spent roughly a quar-
ter of the time for which the authors have data in a state of default or
restructuring, and Mexico has been in this condition nearly half the time. 
The ability to borrow freely is a hallmark of developed ﬁnancial mar-
kets, which help channel funds to efﬁcient uses. And default in the after-
math of a negative shock can occur even in a well-functioning world
ﬁnancial system. Whether the costs of default exceed the beneﬁts of bor-
rowing is a key question. The authors do not attempt such an evaluation,
but they believe that, for many emerging market economies, any potential
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direct and collateral costs of default. They note that external borrowing
has often been driven by shortsighted governments eager to boost con-
sumption rather than to fund high-return projects. More important, they
argue that default imposes large systemic costs through the damage it
does to the country’s banking and ﬁnancial system, and that, having once
borne those costs, a country is typically more willing to risk default again,
further weakening those institutions. Some countries take great pains to
avoid this vicious cycle by remaining in the no-default group even when
they ﬁnd they have overborrowed. And the authors reason that those
countries that have not resisted default are likely to be exceptionally debt
intolerant in that borrowing levels that might be acceptable for others are
dangerous to them. 
How much debt is too much? Data covering the past thirty years for
middle-income countries, which include most emerging market econo-
mies with access to private external ﬁnancing, show a wide range of
indebtedness among defaulters. External debt in these countries at the
time of their default averaged 71 percent of GNP and ranged from 13 per-
cent (Russia in 1991) to 214 percent (Guyana in 1982), with a median
around 60 percent. In 13 percent of the defaults, external debt was below
40 percent of GNP, and in 13 percent it was greater than GNP. Despite
this wide range, the authors show that the defaulters, as a group, look sub-
stantially different from the nondefaulters. Averaging each country’s data
over 1970–2001, they ﬁnd that the frequency distribution of defaulters is
massed around a higher ratio of debt to GNP. Since 1979, when IIR
scores ﬁrst became available, individual countries’ IIRs have varied
widely over time, and there has been a positive correlation between risk
(as measured by subtracting the IIR from 100) and debt-to-GNP ratios. 
As a way of structuring their ideas, the authors sort countries into bor-
rowers’ “clubs” according to their debt intolerance, which the authors
measure by a combination of IIRs and debt ratios. They ﬁrst sort accord-
ing to whether a country’s IIR is within 1 standard deviation of the mean
IIR of the sample over 1979–2002, or above or below that interval. Coun-
tries with a mean IIR above 67.7 are in club A; these countries are all
advanced economies and enjoy virtually continuous access to capital mar-
kets, whatever their debt ratios. Countries with a mean IIR below 24.1 are
in club C; these countries rely primarily on grants and ofﬁcial loans for
their external ﬁnance. Countries with mean IIRs between these values are
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This is the group on which the authors focus their analysis. They further
sort the countries in club B into four regions according to whether their
IIR is above or below the mean for all countries, and whether their debt-
to-GNP ratio is above or below 35 percent, the mean ratio for non-
defaulters. The authors posit that countries in the lowest region, region
IV, are at risk of falling into club C, whereas countries in region I have a
chance of graduating into club A. 
The authors turn next to what it takes to bring about such movement.
Although they recognize that a range of political and structural changes
could affect a country’s status as a borrower, they focus on what might
be inferred from its debt and economic history alone. They perform
cross-sectional regressions explaining countries’ average IIR during
1979–2000 with a number of variables that measure default history and
inﬂation experience (both of which are largely predetermined in their
sample) and average debt ratios. They also use dummy variables to sepa-
rate countries in club A from the others. Estimates are presented both for
ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions and for regressions using the
average debt ratio during 1970–78 as an instrument, to account for endo-
geneity in the debt ratio. The estimated coefﬁcients are uniformly of the
sign the authors expect. The debt-to-GNP ratio has a strong negative
effect on the IIR for countries in clubs B and C, but the relationship is
positive for club A countries (where total rather than external debt is used
as the debt measure). The percentage of time since 1948 that a country has
spent with annual inﬂation over 40 percent has a negative effect on the
IIR, as does the percentage of years since 1824 spent in a state of default
(or since 1946, but the statistical signiﬁcance of this result is lower). The
number of years since the last default has a positive effect, indicating that
markets gradually, if only partially, forgive. (These results generally pass
conventional significance tests in the OLS regressions but generally do
not in the instrumental variables regressions.) The authors also report on
panel regressions that relate the IIR to debt ratios and dummies separat-
ing the data into three periods. In these regressions (which again span
1979–2000), the pre-debt crisis years (before 1982), the years of the debt
crisis and later of debt relief under the Brady Plan (1983–93), and the
postcrisis years (1994–2000) appear as distinct periods, with IIRs sub-
stantially lower at given debt ratios in the middle period. The authors
interpret these results as showing that debt intolerance is long lived, with
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falling sharply as the crisis unfolded, and remaining low for a decade
thereafter. 
Turning to the implications for the behavior of individual countries in
club B, the authors use their preferred cross-country regression to ask
how a country’s IIR would vary with its debt ratio, holding other things
constant. To control for the nondebt regressors, they multiply their actual
values for each country by their estimated coefficients and calculate pre-
dicted values of each country’s IIR for varying debt ratios. They illus-
trate their findings by comparing Argentina and Malaysia. Argentina
stays in region I, the least debt intolerant of the regions in club B, only as
long as its debt-to-GNP ratio does not exceed 15 percent, and it falls into
region III at debt-to-GNP ratios between 15 and 35 percent. Malaysia,
with its better history of default and inﬂation, remains in region I so long
as its debt ratio is below 35 percent. Both countries fall into region IV
when their debt-to-GNP ratio reaches 40 percent. The authors also use
Brazil’s experience to show how their estimated equation predicts IIRs,
and they use these predicted IIRs together with actual debt ratios to calcu-
late a predicted region. They then compare this predicted region with that
assigned using actual IIRs and debt ratios. Brazil was in default or
restructuring from 1983 through 1993. Before that, its assigned region
was better than its predicted region, indicating that the actual IIRs under-
estimated the country’s riskiness in this period. From 1993 to 2000, both
assigned and predicted values are in agreement, placing Brazil in either
region III or region IV.
The authors search for candidates for graduating out of club B into club
A by looking for those countries whose assigned region within club B has
been well above the country’s predicted region in recent years. The idea is
that, as a country approaches club A status, the coefﬁcients based on the
club B regressions would persistently overestimate its debt intolerance.
During 1992–2000 the ﬁve countries with the largest gaps between their
actual and their predicted region were, in descending order, Greece, Por-
tugal, Thailand, Malaysia, and Chile (the last three with substantially
smaller gaps than the ﬁrst two). 
If its borrowing were used for highly productive investment, a country
might be able to grow out of a high debt ratio. For the period 1970–2000
the authors identify twenty-two episodes in which middle-income coun-
tries reduced their debt-to-GNP ratios by at least 25 percentage points
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difﬁcult to clear through growth alone. The authors ﬁnd that ﬁfteen of
their twenty-two episodes coincided with a default or a restructuring and
that in only four of these was growth the principal factor in the decline of
the debt ratio. It was an important secondary factor in seven other cases.
In the seven episodes that involved no default or restructuring, rapid
growth was the main factor in two and an important secondary factor in
four others. The authors observe that most of the seventeen countries that
took part in Brady bond restructurings in the 1990s were not on the list of
episodes they examined, because their debt ratios did not decline enough.
Indeed, the debt ratios for many of these countries have risen above their
levels at the start of their Brady deals, and three countries that made use of
these restructurings have again defaulted. The authors suggest that future
restructurings should be designed so as to reduce the likelihood of such
relapses.
Historically, external debt has been the main or only source of ﬁnanc-
ing ﬁscal deﬁcits for emerging market economies, and the authors focus
on it in most of their empirical analysis. However, they also note that
domestically issued debt is becoming increasingly important for many
middle-income countries, and they warn that it now subjects these coun-
tries to many of the same perils to which foreign debt has subjected them
in the past. In some, domestic debt has already been at the heart of prob-
lems. Mexico’s tesobonos were dollar-denominated domestic securities
and therefore exposed the country to exchange rate risk, and similar debt
has contributed to recent crises in Argentina and Uruguay. The authors
acknowledge that even dollarized domestic debt is not identical to foreign
debt in its characteristics and implications: most domestic debt is owed to
domestic residents, and there is less risk of a cutoff of international trade
credits in the case of a domestic default or restructuring. But they also
argue that the risks of domestic and foreign debt are not completely sepa-
rable. Financial integration and open capital accounts have encouraged
arbitrage between them, and foreigners now own some domestic debt.
And a default on that debt, much of which is dollarized or otherwise
linked to economic activity, could trigger a crisis for reputational reasons
and through the havoc it causes to the banking system and to domestic
prosperity. The authors document the growing importance of domestic
debt in many middle-income countries, including many with a history of
default, and judge that this exposure could lie at the heart of future crises. 
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principal policy instrument, by more than 5 percentage points since the
end of 2000, yet unemployment continued to drift upward in the ﬁrst half
of 2003. Although the central bank remains dedicated to maintaining eco-
nomic expansion, interest rates at all maturities are already low, leaving
less scope than usual for further monetary stimulus. Especially in such an
environment, it is sensible to complement monetary policy with well-
targeted ﬁscal stimulus. But recent developments complicate the pro-
spects for doing so. The federal budget has already undergone a profound
reversal, with large deﬁcits replacing the surpluses that a few years ago
were projected for 2003 and beyond. And politicians have obscured the
distinction between the long-run and short-run budgetary needs of the
economy. In the second paper of this volume, Alan Auerbach analyzes the
current state of ﬁscal policy and our understanding of its determinants and
effects. He examines how the present budget situation arose, looks for
historical evidence on how budgetary and economic conditions have typ-
ically affected ﬁscal policy, assesses what we know about the effects of
ﬁscal policy on the economy, and considers the prospects for budgets at
all levels of government in the years ahead. 
In January 2001 the Congressional Budget Ofﬁce (CBO) projected a
federal budget surplus for ﬁscal year 2003 of $359 billion. By March of
this year it was projecting a $246 billion deﬁcit. Auerbach provides infor-
mative disaggregations of this $605 billion shift. Only about one-sixth
comes from cyclical shortfalls in revenue, $126 billion is directly attrib-
uted to legislation that reduced taxes, $112 billion comes from higher pro-
jected spending excluding debt service, and $42 billion represents higher
debt service costs. The remainder, over $200 billion, comes from what the
CBO calls “technical factors,” a recognition that revenue in 2000 and the
years immediately preceding was enhanced by capital gains, income
related to options, bonuses, and similar transitory sources of income that,
in retrospect, should not have been projected to persist. 
The CBO’s projections extend ten years into the future and show that
the surplus projected for 2011 has declined from $889 billion in the 2001
projection to $231 billion in the March 2003 projection. However, Auer-
bach shows that the methodology that the CBO is required to follow
makes this latest projection particularly unrealistic. It reflects existing
tax law, so that most of the tax reductions passed since 2000 are assumed
to expire as scheduled, and the fraction of taxpayers paying the alterna-
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methodology also assumes, contrary to recent experience, that discre-
tionary spending will remain constant in real terms as the economy and
the population grow. If, instead, expiring tax provisions are extended,
discretionary spending remains a constant fraction of GDP, and the AMT
is amended so as to keep constant the fraction of taxpayers paying it, the
surplus projected for 2011 becomes a deficit of $320 billion. Although
that figure differs by well over a trillion dollars from the $889 billion
surplus originally projected, such a deficit would not amount to a large
share of GDP by recent historical standards. As discussed below, how-
ever, Auerbach argues that the long-run budget outlook is considerably
more precarious because the CBO projections ignore the looming oblig-
ations of the federal government’s entitlements programs, primarily
those for the elderly.
To get some historical perspective on recent developments, Auerbach
turns to an econometric analysis of how the federal government has con-
ducted ﬁscal policy in the past. He starts with estimates of the full-
employment surplus constructed by the CBO, which have the advantage
of being available on a quarterly basis over 1955:2 to 2002:4. A regres-
sion that explains this surplus by its own lagged value and the lagged out-
put gap (the gap between potential and actual GDP), both as a share of
full-employment GDP, shows that ﬁscal policy over this long period has
been countercyclical and has also tended to reduce both budget surpluses
and budget deﬁcits. These estimated responses are larger when the sample
begins in 1984:3, and largest when it begins in 1993:2, thus covering the
Clinton administration and the present administration. To investigate
whether the results depend on which party controls Congress and the
White House, Auerbach adds to the regression dummy variables for quar-
ters when a Republican was president and when the government was
divided between the major parties, as well as variables interacting those
dummy variables with the gap and surplus variables. According to these
estimates, policy was more responsive to both economic and budgetary
conditions during the Clinton administration than it was during the
remainder of the sample. 
Auerbach notes that changes in the full-employment budget surplus are
a ﬂawed proxy for discretionary ﬁscal actions. One main problem is illus-
trated by the decline in income tax revenue that shows up as the large
technical changes to the CBO projections described above. These revenue
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reﬂect neither a discretionary change in ﬁscal policy nor even a develop-
ment that would be a stimulus to the economy. Timing is another prob-
lem. The full-employment surplus changes in response not only to current
policy decisions but also to decisions made well before the current quar-
ter; the phased-in tax cuts legislated in 2001 are an example. Finally, the
responsiveness of revenue and transfers to economic conditions may vary
with time, leading to an inaccurate division of surplus changes into auto-
matic and discretionary components and raising the possibility of a spuri-
ous correlation of discretionary changes with the output gap. To deal with
these problems, Auerbach constructs an alternative measure of discre-
tionary ﬁscal actions based on explicit policy changes. 
The CBO typically publishes two major revisions of its budget projec-
tions each year, the first at the start of the year and the second around
midyear. Auerbach uses those changes attributed to legislative action
between revisions to derive a roughly semiannual series of changes in
revenue and expenditure due to policy. A drawback of this measure is
that the continuous series can only be constructed starting in 1984. And
the timing and enactment of legislation are again a complication. Some
changes are permanent whereas others are temporary, and furthermore,
changes legislated in the current period may affect future periods differ-
ently. Although he notes these complications, Auerbach ﬁrst forms a
series by simply calculating changes in the current year’s surplus that are
legislated in the current ﬁscal year. Regressions over 1984–2003 that
explain these changes with the lagged output gap and the lagged surplus
show that both have significant, negative coefficients of the same order
of magnitude as in the regressions explaining the full-employment sur-
plus over the same period. He next takes account of current legislation
that takes effect in future years by adding the discounted value of provi-
sions taking effect up to four years later, using a discount rate of about 50
percent a year, the value that optimizes the fit of the equation. Changes in
this more inclusive measure of the surplus are best explained by an equa-
tion that uses the level of these projected surpluses in place of the lagged
surplus. These same right-hand-side variables also explain changes in the
full-employment surplus described above, and with roughly similar coef-
ﬁcients. (The generally countercyclical response of spending, and the
response of spending to surpluses, are also supported by regressions based
on changes in nondefense discretionary spending.) 
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an additional observation for changes legislated in 1981, the ﬁrst year of
Ronald Reagan’s presidency, as well as annual changes for 1982 and
1983. When the period is extended to include those observations, the ﬁrst
Reagan year stands out as experiencing an unusually large reduction in
the surplus, although it is not the only exceptional year in the sample by
this criterion. To examine this episode more fully, Auerbach separates the
dependent variable into its revenue and expenditure components and adds
a dummy for the change in the 1981 observation in both regressions.
These show that the Reagan revolution was a very large outlier both in
reducing expenditure and in cutting taxes. Auerbach explores the more
general importance of political orientation by dividing up the 1984–2003
period according to whether the president was a Republican or a Demo-
crat, and the results show no important differences. 
However, the policy initiatives being legislated in the current fiscal
year appear to have long-run budget consequences that are very different
from those that the estimated equations would predict. On the assumption
that the proposed tax and spending changes are permanent and constant as
a fraction of GDP starting in 2004, Auerbach calculates that their cumula-
tive ten-year budget impact would be a revenue loss of $1,455 billion and
a spending increase, net of interest, of $725 billion. Under present surplus
and economic conditions, the equations predict only a $148 billion rev-
enue loss and $220 billion in higher spending. Thus, viewed in terms of
their long-run budget consequences, the present ﬁscal initiatives stand out
as an important ideological initiative, just as the Reagan revolution did.
But whereas reduced spending partly offset the effect of the Reagan tax
cuts on the surplus, that is not the case this time. 
State and local governments face severe ﬁnancial problems today. Col-
lectively, their current budgets, which measure capital expenditure as the
ﬂow of capital services rather than current investment expenditure, were
in deficit in 2002 by 0.5 percent of potential GDP; their cash flow bud-
gets, which include investment expenditure, were in deficit by 1.2 per-
cent of potential GDP. To gauge the likely aggregate response of states
and localities to these problems, Auerbach investigates how their fiscal
actions have responded to budgetary and economic conditions in the past.
The analysis largely parallels that of the federal ﬁscal response. Regres-
sions show that state and local governments typically reduce the sector’s
full-employment surplus (which is based on their current budgets) by
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lagged GDP gap. These results are not surprising in light of the restric-
tions on deﬁcits that most states face. Auerbach also performs regressions
in which the dependent variable is explicit ﬁscal policy changes rather
than changes in the full-employment surplus. For this purpose he uses
data on legislated changes in revenue and spending for 1988–2002
assembled by James Poterba from the annual Fiscal Survey of the States.
These confirm the absence of countercyclical behavior found in the full-
employment surplus regressions, and they produce very large estimated
effects on revenue and spending from actual budgetary conditions. Sepa-
rate regressions explaining legislated changes in revenue and spending,
using the lagged surplus and the surplus projected before legislated
changes as explanatory variables, estimate little effect on current-year
revenue but very large effects on current-year spending and next year’s
revenue. The sum of the effects of lagged and projected surpluses is about
–1 on each of these dependent variables. The best-ﬁtting equations add
revisions to the projected current surplus from other than legislated
changes—the surplus shock—to the regressions. In these regressions the
sum of the effects of all three surplus variables on both current spending
and next year’s revenue remains large but above –1.0. Auerbach suggests
that these last estimates are especially vulnerable to simultaneity bias.
Using the estimates that omit the surplus shock, he calculates that state
and local governments can be expected to cut current spending by $24 bil-
lion in 2003 and to increase taxes by $4 billion for 2003 and by $22 bil-
lion for 2004. 
Turning from the current situation to the longer run, Auerbach suggests
that the “real ﬁscal danger” (a phrase taken from the president’s 2004
budget proposal) comes from the future liabilities of old-age entitlement
programs—liabilities that are not adequately reﬂected in current bud-
getary presentations or in the debates that are informed by them. Auer-
bach calculates the implicit annual deﬁcits of the Social Security system
using the conventional seventy-ﬁve-year horizon and the “closed group”
concept, which considers the present value of future beneﬁts, net of future
contributions, only of age cohorts already participating in the program.
The implicit debt of the program calculated in this way rises from
$7.7 trillion in 1997 to $11.1 trillion in 2003. (Auerbach adds that the
implicit long-term liabilities of Medicare are estimated to be at least as
large as these Social Security liabilities.) Because of changing assump-
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clear pattern but on balance reduce the implicit debt, the annual implicit
deﬁcits range from $173 billion to $878 billion over this period. Ignoring
the effect of changing assumptions, the implicit annual deﬁcit rises from
$523 billion to $731 billion and will continue rising as the retirement of
the baby boomers approaches. The deﬁcits calculated under either of
these concepts, and under reasonable alternative ways of calculating the
present value of future commitments, are drastically different from the
current cash-ﬂow surpluses of Social Security presented in the budget and
in budget projections. How this affects either private agents’ behavior or
the deliberations of government policymakers is an important question for
which there is no agreed-upon answer. However, Auerbach suggests that
both could be affected. In particular, he suggests that the much larger total
deﬁcits that would result from incorporating the implicit deﬁcits in the
budget could, appropriately, restrain government behavior. 
Economists have found it difficult to measure the impact of fiscal pol-
icy on the economy, and Auerbach reviews a number of reasons why this
might be so. Estimation problems arise because the endogenous response
of policy to the state of the economy is mingled with the effects of policy
on the economy, and separating these requires identifying what was an
exogenous shock. Characterizing fiscal shocks poses other problems.
Revenue effects are a simple characterization of tax changes, but they do
not capture possible responses to changed incentives or the distribution
of benefits and losses across income groups. Accounting for expectations
is especially difﬁcult. Permanent and temporary changes may have differ-
ent effects, and whether a ﬁscal position is seen as sustainable may affect
how private agents react to it. Auerbach describes how the Clinton policy
program could plausibly have produced an expansionary budget contrac-
tion by gradually convincing agents in capital and goods markets that
budget discipline would be long lasting. But he notes that this explanation
for the late-1990s’ boom depends on a complicated set of responses and
changes in expectations, making it difﬁcult to verify and leaving many
analysts skeptical. 
Auerbach notes that the present conjuncture of ﬁscal policy and the
economy is unusual. Interest rates are low, and expectations of future
rates embodied in longer maturities have been volatile. State and local
governments face unprecedented deﬁcits that will lead to a historic con-
traction of their aggregate budgets in the immediate future. At the federal
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relative to GDP. But the implicit debt and deﬁcits of the entitlements pro-
grams are not, and hence in Auerbach’s view the United States is in a
period of severe ﬁscal stress. Yet in this situation the president and Con-
gress are pursuing a much larger expansion of federal deﬁcits over the
next decade than historical analysis would predict. Auerbach ﬁnds it difﬁ-
cult to forecast how the economy will respond to such a policy regime. 
Since 1995 the Japanese economy has seemed to be in a liquidity trap,
a situation last seen in a major industrial economy during the Great
Depression. Japanese wholesale prices have been slipping since the end
of 2000, consumer prices are lower today than they were in 1998, and
growth has been anemic. Monetary policy has appeared powerless to gen-
erate a healthy expansion. The overnight interest rate on cash has been
within 50 basis points of zero for several years, and virtually at zero most
recently, and as a result, the monetary authority has been unable to keep
real interest rates from rising as prices fell. Nor has vigorous expansion of
the monetary base had an apparent effect on the Japanese economy. More
recently, unemployment rates in the United States and most other indus-
trial countries have been rising while inﬂation has fallen to very low rates,
by some measures near zero. This situation, viewed alongside the pro-
longed deﬂationary experience of Japan, has heightened interest in the
special problems that deﬂation poses for stabilization policy. Although
most economists would agree with Federal Reserve Chairman Alan
Greenspan that deﬂation is not an imminent danger in the United States,
they also believe it would pose problems for policy if it took hold. And
many would agree with Paul Krugman’s emphasis, in a 1998 Brookings
Paper, on the need for policymakers to affect private sector expectations
in the face of a possible deﬂation. In the third paper of this volume, Gauti
Eggertsson and Michael Woodford present a detailed theoretical analysis
of the way policy and expectations interact, providing guidance on the
appropriate policy before, during, and after the economy falls into a liq-
uidity trap. 
To analyze the implications for the conduct and effectiveness of mone-
tary policy of the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates, the authors
utilize an explicitly intertemporal model in which expectations play a cen-
tral role. The model assumes a representative household that consumes a
composite consumption good and supplies each of the various types of
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and hence no national saving in equilibrium. The important intertemporal
link is the assumption that the household equates the marginal utility of
forgone consumption at time t with the discounted expected marginal util-
ity of the increased consumption thereby made available at time t + 1.
Because of these links, the household’s current consumption and labor
supply decisions depend on the entire expected future path of short-term
real interest rates. Those real rates in turn depend on the nominal rates set
by the monetary authority. Real money balances are included in the
household utility function, and the demand for such balances can be sati-
ated even at a zero interest rate and with a ﬁnite money supply.
To provide a logical basis for sticky prices, the authors adopt the stan-
dard assumption that goods are differentiated and produced by monopo-
listically competitive ﬁrms. Prices in a given industry are ﬁxed for a
random period of time, and, by symmetry, all ﬁrms in an industry set the
same price when they have the opportunity. Demands for the differenti-
ated goods are a constant-elasticity function of household income and
price. For simplicity, the production function relating output to labor
input is the same for each good and subject only to a common exogenous
productivity shock. Firms in different industries use different types of
labor. Wages, in contrast to prices, are completely ﬂexible, equating the
supply and demand of each type of labor. 
The authors focus on the optimal conduct of monetary policy and
include only a limited role for ﬁscal policy in their model. Taxes and
transfers are nondistorting, and there is no government consumption.
However, the government determines the time path of total government
liabilities and their composition, which includes non-interest-bearing
money. The total is determined by a rule that speciﬁes the real level of lia-
bilities as a function of the preexisting level and current macroeconomic
conditions. A similar rule governs the maturity and state-dependent struc-
ture of debt. The model assumes Arrow-Debreu markets that are complete
across time and states of nature, and it imposes no limits on borrowing.
The household optimizes its consumption, taking prices at a given time
and in a given state of the economy as given, subject to a single intertem-
poral budget constraint. Because the government does not consume
goods, any saving or dissaving by the government is exactly matched by
dissaving or saving by the household. 
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term interest rates matters in their model: changing future monetary
actions, which affect future nominal rates and inﬂation, affect current as
well as future output. Although the path of expected short-term rates
implies a term structure of rates on assets of longer maturity, the authors
show that, given actual and expected short-term rates, open-market oper-
ations or government debt policy actions that change the composition of
privately held nonmonetary debt have no effect on the economy. This
neutrality result arises because the representative household’s intertempo-
ral budget constraint is unaffected by such changes. With no government
consumption, the household’s intertemporal budget constraint mirrors
that of the government. 
The dependence of the present on the future becomes particularly
important when the economy is in a liquidity trap, with the nominal inter-
est rate at zero. In those circumstances changing the quantity of money, or
“quantitative easing,” is not a separate policy instrument because house-
holds are indifferent between holding money and holding short-term gov-
ernment debt. But this does not mean monetary policy is powerless. Even
in these circumstances, output and prices do respond to changes in
expected future monetary actions; the monetary authority can mitigate the
effects of the constraint by affecting the private sector’s expectations
about the future path of short-term rates. In particular, a credible commit-
ment to lower nominal rates and higher inﬂation when the economy is no
longer in the trap will raise current prices and output. Hence managing
expectations about future monetary policy is crucial. 
The authors note that various actions that do not directly affect the
path of short-term rates may nonetheless be important because they affect
the private sector’s expectations about future policy. Quantitative easing
that expands the money supply today to a level that, if left unchanged,
would result in greater inflation in the future may be one way to affect
those expectations. Buying long-term bonds when their yields imply
higher future short-term rates than the policymaker intends is another.
Not only does policy need to be forward looking; when the economy is in
a trap, it needs to credibly commit to lower rates and higher inflation in
the future than will seem optimal at that later date. As the authors note,
this implies that an optimal rule is not just forward looking; it needs to be
backward looking as well: to be credible in the future, current policy
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the trap.
How important is the constraint created by the lower bound on nominal
interest rates, and how should policy be adapted to minimize its costs? To
address these questions the authors numerically simulate a log-linear
approximation of the full model around a zero-inﬂation steady state. This
approximate model can be summarized by two forward-looking equa-
tions, one relating current output to expected future output and the differ-
ence between the expected real rate and the natural real rate of interest,
the other relating inﬂation to the output gap and expected inﬂation.
Shocks in the full model are captured in the stochastic natural real rate
and a “cost-push” disturbance to the inﬂation rate. The parameters of
these two equations are chosen so as to provide plausible dynamics. 
The authors ﬁrst consider a rule targeting inﬂation. To illustrate how a
commitment to inﬂation can mitigate the effects of the lower bound on
interest rates, they simulate the model with an unexpected shock that low-
ers the natural rate from its steady-state value of 4 percent to –2 percent.
Each period following the shock there is a 10 percent chance that the nat-
ural rate returns to its steady-state value. If the monetary authority
chooses zero inﬂation as its target, its inability to set a negative nominal
rate results in a 14 percent output gap and 11 percent annual deﬂation
while in the trap. The fall in the natural rate reduces output, thereby
putting immediate downward pressure on inﬂation and raising the real
interest rate, which in turn further reduces output. These effects are ampli-
ﬁed by the fact that there is a 90 percent chance of remaining in the trap
with deﬂation in the following period; the expectation of future deﬂation
increases today’s deﬂation. Setting a target inﬂation rate of 1 percent sub-
stantially reduces the fall in output and prices, because the private sector’s
expectation of 1 percent inﬂation once out of the trap stimulates demand.
But the rate of deﬂation is still 4 percent and the output gap just over
7 percent in this case. A policy that credibly commits to 2 percent inﬂa-
tion, cutting the nominal rate to zero when the natural rate falls to –2 per-
cent, avoids any output decline. However, full avoidance is not optimal.
The authors note that although commitment to a higher inﬂation target
reduces the output gap in periods when the natural rate of interest falls
below zero, it comes with inﬂationary distortions, both in normal times
and when the natural rate is negative. For this reason, the optimal inﬂation
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risk of running into the trap. 
This simple rule of targeting a ﬁxed inﬂation rate is not optimal.
Because it does not respond to current or historical conditions, it does not
optimize the objectives of stabilizing output and inﬂation. The authors
show that one can do better if the policy is state dependent and the policy-
maker can credibly commit to a history-dependent rule even if, as in their
model, past conditions are irrelevant to what can be achieved at present.
The authors recognize that it may be difﬁcult to make such policies credi-
ble, because a policymaker is committing to actions in the future that will
not appear optimal then. But since the best rational expectations equilib-
rium requires credibility, they ﬁrst consider optimal policy assuming it is
credible before considering how to achieve credibility. They derive the
optimal policy response to the shock to the natural rate considered above,
assuming the government wants to minimize the discounted expected
value of a quadratic function of inﬂation and the output gap. The optimal
interest rate policy has several interesting features. First, it is history
dependent. It involves committing the monetary authority to the creation
of a future output boom, with accompanying inﬂation, once the natural
rate again turns positive. As in the case of ﬁxed inﬂation targeting just
discussed, this commitment stimulates demand and reduces deﬂationary
pressures when the economy is in the trap. And, as in the case of inﬂation
targeting, the distortionary costs of creating such a boom mean that it will
not be optimal to completely offset the fall in the natural real rate. How-
ever, the rule improves on ﬁxed inﬂation targeting by gradually eliminat-
ing the boom and the associated inﬂation following the return of the
natural rate to its normal level.
The optimal interest rate policy is a complicated function of the current
and past states of the economy as well as expectations of the future, even
if one assumes the simplest stochastic process for the natural rate. The
authors suggest that a complete description of the state-contingent interest
rate rule is unlikely to be feasible and, even if it could be provided, would
be extremely difﬁcult to communicate to the private sector. Yet accurate
private sector expectations are crucial to the policy’s effectiveness. Fortu-
nately, the authors are able to show that the optimal policy is equivalent to
a simpler rule that speciﬁes a single target that is a ﬁxed-weight index of
the price level and the output gap (which, except for the fact that the
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This target is adjusted up or down depending on whether the actual value
of the index is below or above the target, respectively. When in a trap, for
example, the index will typically be below the target, with an output gap
and deﬂation. Because of this shortfall, the target is raised. In effect, the
policymaker commits to respond to a current shortfall in the index of
prices and output by raising the target it will pursue when it is possible to
do so. 
Because even this simpliﬁed characterization of optimal policy is
likely to be difﬁcult to communicate to the private sector, the authors also
examine the performance of a ﬁxed target rule. They show that such a rule
does quite well: it is fully optimal in the absence of the zero bound, and it
results in losses only slightly greater than with the fully optimal rule when
the zero bound occasionally binds. It may seem surprising that a rule that
does not directly take into account the magnitude of a shock to the natural
rate does so well. The authors suggest that this reﬂects the “automatic sta-
bilizer” built into price-level rules. For example, the larger the negative
shock to the natural rate, the greater the initial deﬂation and fall in output
and, hence, the greater the implied increase in the target index in the
future.
The discussion thus far has concerned the optimal response to an unex-
pected shock to the natural rate of interest. But suppose such a shock is
expected to occur at a future date. Should the policymaker anticipate the
shock by changing the current target, or should it leave the target
unchanged, or should it even forgo expansionary actions that would be
otherwise called for in order to save some scope for more vigorous action
in the future—keeping the powder dry? In the author’s forward-looking
model, the current target level of prices and output should not be changed
in response to news that makes a negative shock more likely sometime in
the future. However, this does not mean that policy will be unchanged
with the news. The private sector’s expectations will change with the
news, generally leading to lower prices and output at a given interest rate
prior to the occurrence of the shock. The policymaker will need to offset
this changed private behavior to achieve its fixed target and therefore
may encounter the lower bound on rates before the shock hits. The
authors recognize that, with more complicated models in which current
output depends not just on current and future variables, it may be optimal
to raise the target levels of output and inﬂation before the shock arrives.
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to be self-fulﬁlling, so that once the economy enters a trap, deﬂation and
output loss continue forever? The authors show that the answer depends
crucially on whether the monetary and ﬁscal authorities allow the nominal
quantity of base money or nominal government liabilities to shrink with
the price level, or instead are committed to maintain those stocks at some
higher level. If they do not allow shrinkage at the rate of deﬂation, the
self-perpetuating deﬂationary spiral will not be an equilibrium and will
eventually be reversed.
The ability of the policymaker to affect expectations is crucial to the
success of policy actions. The authors note that affecting expectations
requires more than simply announcing an optimal policy rule, and they
discuss policies and actions of the monetary authority that may contribute
to the creation of desirable expectations. Publicly announcing and follow-
ing the optimum price-level rule when there would be little cost to pursu-
ing a different policy—as might be the case prior to encountering the
liquidity trap—is one way to make it more credible that the price-level
rule will be followed after the event. Once in the trap, adjusting the quan-
tity of money to a level consistent with the target level of prices and
output, rather than to their actual level, would communicate the policy-
maker’s target and its intent to meet that target when it becomes feasible.
Even if, as in the authors’ model, there are no portfolio effects from open-
market purchases of long-term bonds, such purchases can signal the
authorities’ commitment to keep short-term rates low after the natural rate
returns to normal. Purchases of foreign exchange are another way the cen-
tral bank can signal its intentions. 
The government can also take actions that give it an incentive to follow
the announced policy to inﬂate once out of the trap. For example, a tax cut,
ﬁnanced by debt or money creation, would provide an additional incentive
for the government to inﬂate, as would government purchases of real
assets or foreign exchange. A proposal by Peter Tinsley, that the Federal
Reserve issue options to purchase federal funds at a future date on terms
consistent with its announced policy, would provide similar incentives. If
it issued such options, the Federal Reserve would lose if the funds rate
exceeded its previous commitment. The authors conclude that, “given the
role of private sector anticipation of a history-dependent policy in realizing
a desirable outcome, it is important for central banks to develop effective
methods of signaling their policy commitments to the private sector.”
William C. Brainard and George L. Perry xxvii
1440-00 BPEA/Ed Sum  07/17/03  08:10  Page xxviiDespite decades of research, economists’ ability to forecast the econ-
omy and the effects of policy remains highly uncertain. If anything, there
is less agreement today about the theories and models that describe
macroeconomic behavior and the potential role of policy than there was
forty years ago. Even if economists could agree on the best model of the
economy, uncertainty would remain about the size of the parameters that
determine how forcefully policymakers should act. In light of these per-
vasive uncertainties, how should policymakers make decisions, and how
can researchers best communicate to them the statistical information they
need? In the fourth paper of this issue, William Brock, Steven Durlauf,
and Kenneth West recommend a signiﬁcant change in econometric prac-
tice and describe an approach that they believe facilitates intelligent pol-
icy formation in the presence of uncertainty. 
The authors argue that, in a broad range of contexts, policy evaluation
should be conducted on the basis of two factors: the policymaker’s prefer-
ences (which presumably reﬂect society’s), and the expected distribution
of outcomes conditional on policy and available information. This argu-
ment implies that the focus of much scholarly research on identifying the
true or best model of the economy is of no intrinsic importance; model
selection is not a necessary or even a very valuable component of policy
evaluation. The authors maintain that model selection is actually inappro-
priate in many contexts, because it ignores the uncertainty about models
that is inevitably present. Instead, the authors advocate the use of some
form of model averaging, which provides a formal, disciplined way of
proceeding that is not conditional on a particular economic model being
true. In principle, their approach is quite simple. The policymaker mini-
mizes his or her expected loss, as derived from a function that expresses
the policymaker’s preferences over outcomes, where the expectation is
taken over the entire set of possible models, parameter variables, and
exogenous variables, conditional on the information available and the
speciﬁed policy. The authors believe that, in this approach, “the observed
history of the economy and policy advice are seamlessly integrated,” in
contrast to conventional approaches, which typically judge a policy’s efﬁ-
cacy by the statistical signiﬁcance of an estimated coefﬁcient from a par-
ticular model. 
In practice, policymakers are confronted with a variety of possible
models, reﬂecting different theories and speciﬁcations of economic rela-
tionships, with different implications for the conduct of policy. The
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merits special attention, but they defer until later in the paper both that
discussion and the discussion of loss functions that incorporate aversion
to ambiguity. The authors begin their analysis with the relatively simple
case of a speciﬁc model for which there is uncertainty about unknowns, θ,
and where the policymaker seeks to minimize expected loss. In this sim-
ple case, θ represents whatever unknown quantities affect the loss func-
tion, including both random shocks that have not been perceived when
policy actions are taken and the values of the parameters that determine
the effects of policy. 
After describing this setup formally, the authors draw out three impli-
cations of this approach that differ from conventional econometric prac-
tice. First, the relevant uncertainty about θ  may not necessarily be
described adequately by its expected value and its variance; the entire
posterior probability distribution of θ may be relevant. Second, the statis-
tical signiﬁcance of a policy variable in a regression does not reveal
whether or how much that variable should be changed. Whereas discus-
sion of monetary policy rules focuses on loss functions, thereby avoiding
this complaint, the economic growth literature is dominated by hypothesis
testing and is thus vulnerable to it. Third, the conventional econometric
distinction between parameters and estimates of parameters is deficient,
as is the practice of reporting standard errors of estimates. More inclu-
sive measures of uncertainty concerning the underlying parameters are
needed. 
Turning to model uncertainty, the authors observe that it is conceptu-
ally straightforward to extend expected loss calculations from one model
to several by model averaging, that is, by treating the identity of the true
model as an unobserved random variable and weighting the various plau-
sible models by their probability of being the right one. Although it is
common econometric practice to report results from some modiﬁcations
of a baseline model to gauge the robustness of a ﬁnding, this informal
robustness testing does not provide a way of combining information from
these different speciﬁcations. The posterior probability of a model
depends both on how well it ﬁts the data and on the prior probability that
this model is the right one. Although these priors could be based on a vari-
ety of sources, including earlier research, a common assumption is that
the models being considered have equal prior probabilities. But the
authors note that this assumption does not justify placing equal weights
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depend on the relative goodness of ﬁt of the various models. They also
observe that the uncertainty faced by policymakers is not a simple
weighted average of the uncertainty present in each of the alternative
models. Differences in the expected outcomes from different models con-
tribute to overall uncertainty and may be much more important than the
uncertainty associated with any one of the models. 
The authors also consider the possibility that policymakers may treat
uncertainty about models differently than they treat other sources of
uncertainty. They interpret various experimental results, such as the Ells-
berg paradox, as suggesting that agents’ behavior in some settings is
inconsistent with expected utility maximization, and they note that this
can be interpreted as a distaste for model uncertainty. (Ellsberg found that
respondents tended to choose a game that they knew they had a 50 percent
chance of winning, over a game in which the chance of winning was
unknown but had an expected value of 50 percent.) They regard work by
Itzhak Gilboa and David Schmeidler and others on ambiguity aversion as
providing not just an explanation of behavior but an axiomatic justiﬁca-
tion for why it may be rational to place more weight on the least-favored
model than is warranted by posterior probabilities. The authors propose
an approach suggested by Larry Epstein and Tau Wang that formalizes
such behavior by specifying a loss function that places weights both on
the expected loss computed in Bayesian fashion and on the model that
gives the worst outcome. If all of the weight were placed on this second
term, policymakers would follow minimax behavior. This can be thought
of as the response to an “adversarial agent” who chooses that model
which is least favorable to the policymaker. The authors discuss the simi-
larities of this formulation to the extreme bounds analysis proposed by
Edward Leamer and the robust optimal control advocated by Lars
Hansen and Thomas Sargent. Both of these approaches can also be
thought of as embodying ambiguity aversion, but without making use of
model probabilities.
The authors go on to a formal analysis showing how a concern for the
robustness of a policy choice, meaning a desire to avoid worst outcomes,
can affect optimal policy. They begin by considering a core model in
which some parameter is ﬁxed, and where the alternative models are
“local” in that they differ only in allowing this parameter to lie in a small,
well-deﬁned interval around the ﬁxed value. The policymaker’s behavior
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minimization. For example, if one were minimizing expected loss, a small
amount of uncertainty about the parameter would have no effect on opti-
mal policy. Concern with the worst model causes even a small amount of
uncertainty to have a ﬁrst-order effect. 
The authors also discuss other differences that arise. They ﬁnd that pol-
icy responds more or less to some unexpected shock depending on the
speciﬁcs of the particular model. The authors provide two examples. In
the ﬁrst, the policymaker controls two instruments that have uncertain
effects on a single target. In the second, modeled after the analysis of Lars
Svensson, the policymaker is concerned about both output, which the pol-
icymaker controls, and inﬂation, which depends on output, shocks, and its
own lagged value. In the ﬁrst example the authors show that, even for a
small increase in uncertainty about the variance in the effect of an instru-
ment, robustness considerations will lead to less aggressive use of that
instrument and, unless there is an unusual amount of covariance of the
inﬂuences of the two instruments, to more aggressive use of the other
instrument. In the second example they show that greater uncertainty
about the feedback of inflation on itself leads to a more aggressive
response of policy to unexpected shocks to inflation than otherwise.
Robust analysis leads the policymaker to focus on the possibility of
higher persistence that ampliﬁes the effect of inﬂationary shocks unless
offset by policy. In this example the authors also discuss the effect of
uncertainty about the inﬂuence of the controlled variable, output, on inﬂa-
tion. A smaller response is less desirable. But the effect of adding mini-
max concerns depends on the relative weights in the loss function on
inﬂation and output. The larger the weight on inﬂation, the more aggres-
sive the policymaker will be in controlling output. Extending this type of
analysis to multiple core models is conceptually straightforward, but, as
in the simpler examples, the authors show that it is difﬁcult, without
knowing the details of the models’ speciﬁcations, to draw presumptions
about how robust analysis affects optimal behavior.
Recognizing that there are many candidate models of the economy
complicates the tasks of both researcher and policymaker. The authors
propose what they believe to be a useful way to structure the model space.
They identify three distinct types of uncertainty: theory uncertainty,
which primarily reﬂects the multiplicity of competing theories and the
absence of empirical evidence that would allow one to adjudicate deci-
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as lag lengths, nonlinearities, and the choice of empirical proxies for vari-
ables included in the theoretical model; and heterogeneity uncertainty, or
uncertainty about the extent to which observations from different settings
(for example, countries), different phases of the business cycle, or differ-
ent historical episodes should be treated as realizations of the same
model. They discuss the difﬁculties that arise if the class of models con-
sidered does not include the “true” model, and they suggest that incorpo-
rating model uncertainty minimizes the danger from this source.
Although many economists are likely to ﬁnd the authors’ framework
conceptually attractive, some will wonder whether it can be put to practi-
cal use. The authors provide two examples of how their approach to
model uncertainty might be implemented, one involving monetary policy
and the other economic growth. Both topics have been subjected to exten-
sive study using more traditional procedures. 
In the ﬁrst example, the authors examine how estimates, using U.S.
data, of the performance of a Taylor rule differ when model averaging is
used to deal with speciﬁcation uncertainty about the Phillips and IS
curves that drive inﬂation and the output gap. This example illustrates a
frequentist or pseudo-Bayesian approach in which models are given prior
probabilities, but the parameters used in each model are not. Theory pro-
vides little guidance about the number of lagged values of inﬂation, the
output gap, and interest rates to use on the right-hand side of the equa-
tions, especially since they are meant to capture the effects of expec-
tations. To simplify their example, the authors restrict themselves to
“backward looking” equations, and, using quarterly data, they allow up to
four lags of each of these variables and for the possibility of a structural
change in 1984. The sum of the lagged inﬂation variables in the Phillips
curve is always constrained to be 1, and the lagged real interest rate is
always included in the IS relation. The various combinations of lags in
their speciﬁcation produce a total of 25,600 models, each of which is esti-
mated by least squares. Expected loss is taken to be a weighted sum of the
variances of inﬂation, the output gap, and changes in interest rates. The
speciﬁc Taylor rules that the authors use are those that are optimal for dif-
ferent target weights if the economic model is the one estimated by Glenn
Rudebusch and Svensson in a 1999 paper. This model corresponds to just
one of the authors’ models. For each of these Taylor rules, they compute
the average loss by weighting the expected loss from each of their models
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that, except for two rules in which the penalty for interest rate variability
is low, there is only a small difference between the loss implied by the
average of their models and the loss implied by the Rudebusch and Svens-
son model.
The second application illustrates how a full Bayesian approach can be
used to evaluate the effect of tariffs on economic growth. The authors
begin with an extended discussion of the existing growth literature and
what they see as its deﬁciencies. First, there are nearly as many theories
about growth and as many associated empirical measures as there are
countries for which data are available. Individual theories are often tested
without recognizing that, typically, one growth theory does not logically
preclude another—for example, the theory that political stability affects
growth is compatible with any number of other theories. Second, the liter-
ature does not deal systematically with heterogeneity uncertainty, for
example, whether the coefﬁcient on a policy variable in a cross-country
regression can reliably be applied to a given individual country. Third,
the literature frequently assumes that statistical significance provides a
useful guide to policy evaluation. But using a particular t value as a cut-
off not only implies a special loss function, but in practice ignores model
uncertainty.
Although the authors regard their illustrative example as no more than
a caricature of the actual policy process, since it focuses only on cross-
country regressions and ignores the wealth of other information available
to help inform policy decisions, in fact it amounts to a substantial study in
its own right, dealing with each of their complaints about existing work.
The authors include models representing six different categories of theo-
ries about the determinants of growth, ranging from theories that focus on
exchange rate policies to theories that focus on the characteristics of the
political system. Every model includes the variables predicted by the
Solow growth model and a variable measuring tariffs on intermediate and
capital goods. An effort is made to minimize connections between the the-
ories, so that the probabilities of each theory being relevant are approxi-
mately independent. For each theory the authors typically include more
than one proxy variable to represent the distinctive growth factor it sug-
gests. They pay special attention to the issue of heterogeneity—in partic-
ular, whether the determinants of growth are the same for sub-Saharan
Africa as for the rest of the world. They examine the sensitivity of results
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score. Parameter uncertainty is captured by assuming a uniform prior and
a Gaussian error distribution. Probabilities are assigned using a tree struc-
ture, with probabilities placed on each model, on each of the proxy vari-
ables within each model, and ﬁnally, for each proxy, on whether or not
sub-Saharan Africa differs from the rest of the world. This exercise
results in over 8,000 models. 
The results are quite interesting. The estimated effects of tariffs on
growth are negative and highly signiﬁcant, and variations between esti-
mates with different priors on heterogeneity are modest. Nor is the model
averaging estimate signiﬁcantly different, quantitatively or statistically,
from ordinary least squares estimation of a single model that includes all
available policy and structural variables. The authors also report the full
range of estimates for their portfolio of models, ﬁnding that the tariff vari-
able is always signiﬁcant and that the response in the model with the least
sensitivity of growth to tariffs is roughly 60 percent of that of the model
average. Hence the effects of tariffs seem very robust, but the variation
across models implies that strong ambiguity aversion on the part of the
policymaker would substantially diminish the advantages of tariff reduc-
tion in the policymaker’s view. Heterogeneity turns out to be less impor-
tant than the authors expected. Unless the prior on heterogeneity is quite
high, the possibility of heterogeneity lowers the mean and increases the
posterior distribution of the effects of tariffs only modestly. 
The authors use these results to illustrate how statistical signiﬁcance
may not be the best way to think about the policymaker’s problem. They
calculate the mean and variance of the growth rate for each country in
their sample between 1960 and 1985, with and without a 10 percent
reduction in tariffs, holding all other regressors constant. Several results
stand out. Under model averaging there are large differences in the effect
of the tariff reduction across countries. For example, the 10 percent tariff
reduction is estimated to raise Botswana’s growth over this period by
100 percent but to reduce Burundi’s growth by 13 percent. The effects of
a change in tariffs on the standard deviation of a country’s growth are far
smaller than one would guess from looking at the standard deviation of
the density of the tariff parameter in isolation. In some cases it actually
declines, reﬂecting the covariance of the effects of tariffs and other
growth determinants. This illustrates the importance of computing poste-
rior densities of the outcomes of interest, not focusing on model parame-
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of tariff reduction for sub-Saharan Africa, unless one has very strong pri-
ors that the growth model that applies to the rest of the world does not
apply to that region.
The authors view the incorporation of model uncertainty into econo-
metric and policy analysis as still in its infancy. They see a need to extend
the analysis in many directions: to account for dynamics and the evolution
of the model space over time, to account for nonlinearities and shifts
across regimes, and to recognize that policies can and should be updated
over time as learning takes place. They also see a host of statistical issues
that need attention. But they conclude that “explicit attention to model
uncertainty and the use of decision-theoretic methods will prove to be a
fruitful direction for future macroeconomic research. At a minimum,
explicitly accounting for model uncertainty is an important step in clari-
fying the limits to which econometric analysis can contribute to policy
evaluation.”
More than two-thirds of ﬁrms in the Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 500
currently sponsor deﬁned-beneﬁt (DB) retirement plans, and the value of
assets managed by these plans averages around 15 percent of the market
value of the sponsoring ﬁrm. The deﬁned pension beneﬁts are legal liabil-
ities of the sponsoring ﬁrm, and plans must conform to funding require-
ments speciﬁed under federal regulation. Most plans are at least partly
invested in equities, so that ﬂuctuations in stock prices affect how much a
ﬁrm must contribute to the plan in a given year to keep it adequately
funded. The boom and bust of the stock market since the mid-1990s has
had a signiﬁcant effect on most DB plans and, thus, on the ﬁnancial well-
being of the sponsoring corporations. But how such gyrations affect these
ﬁrms’ stock prices is an unsettled question; the answer depends on what
information is available to shareholders and how they evaluate it. Julia
Coronado and Steven Sharpe address this question in a report in this
issue.
The authors ﬁrst describe how ﬁrms account for pension funds in their
ﬁnancial reports. Whereas the funding requirements of DB plans are spec-
iﬁed by regulation under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA) of 1974, guidelines established by the private sector Financial
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) govern the accounting requirements
for shareholder reports. Many analysts would agree that the net asset
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liabilities appropriately calculated, is a reasonably accurate and transpar-
ent measure of the fund’s ﬁnancial position and its contribution to the
value of the sponsoring ﬁrm. Pension fund net assets could be aggregated
with those of the rest of the ﬁrm to arrive at a consolidated balance sheet
position. Historically, ﬁrms have reported pension fund net asset values,
but not necessarily in their ﬁnancial statements and often without sufﬁ-
cient detail. There has also been a lack of uniformity across ﬁrms in how
future liabilities were valued. In the 1980s, in an attempt to improve
accounting for pension funds, FASB imposed requirements (in FAS
Statement No. 87) that shifted the emphasis. Under these requirements,
ﬁrms must report pension fund net asset values in footnotes to their ﬁnan-
cial statements, and the range of assumptions that ﬁrms may use in setting
the discount rate for the valuation of future obligations has been nar-
rowed. But a different measure of pension obligations, called the net peri-
odic pension cost (NPPC), must be reﬂected in the income statement. 
The NPPC is calculated as the annual accrued cost of the plan minus
the expected return on plan assets. Accrued costs are of two primary
types. The ﬁrst, interest cost, is calculated as the value of pension obliga-
tions at the start of the year multiplied by an assumed discount rate (most
commonly the rate on triple-A-rated corporate bonds); this measures the
increase in the present value of outstanding beneﬁt obligations as
employee retirements move one year closer. The second, service cost, is
calculated as the present value of new obligations, that is, the pension
beneﬁts earned by employees during the current year. On the income side,
the expected return on plan assets is calculated as a “market related” value
of those assets times an assumed rate of return. This assumed rate of
return must bear some relation to returns currently being earned as well as
to returns expected in the future. For valuing assets, most ﬁrms use what
amounts to a ﬁve-year average of past market values, although FAS 87
permits the use of current market values or some formula in between
these extremes. 
In contrast to the transparent concept of net asset value, the authors
label this accounting for pension funds “opaque.” (Although this reﬂects
the authors’ view of which measure gives a more timely and meaningful
picture of a plan’s ﬁnancial position, it does not imply that net asset val-
ues are measured precisely. Market values do exist for plan assets, but the
present value of plan liabilities, the other element in the calculation of net
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mortality as well as about the appropriate discount rate.) The authors
show that the transparent and opaque indicators of pension positions have
been weakly correlated in recent years. Between 1993 and 2001 the ratio
of net pension assets to net pension earnings swung sharply, from –5.2 at
the start to a high of 16.2 in 1997, before falling back to –0.1 in 2001. The
divergence widened abruptly between 1999 and 2001. Net assets fell each
year with the stock market decline, while net pension earnings rose and
then leveled off in step with the moving average of past market values.
Coronado and Sharpe use data for ﬁrms in the S&P 500 to address two
key questions about how the ﬁnancial condition of pension plans is
reﬂected in stock values: Does a ﬁrm’s stock price more nearly reﬂect the
transparent or the opaque measure of the ﬁnancial condition of its pension
plan? And does the stock market value a ﬁrm’s net pension earnings in the
same way that it does earnings from the ﬁrm’s core activities? The
authors use Compustat as their source for historical ﬁnancial data on indi-
vidual ﬁrms, including information about companies’ DB plans, and
I/B/E/S International for stock prices and analysts’ earning forecasts.
Their sample includes all ﬁrms that were in the S&P 500 at any time
between December 1996 and December 1999, except for a few ﬁrms
whose pension fund data were incomplete. Their analysis is based on
annual data from 1993, the ﬁrst year for which all the needed pension data
are available, through 2001, providing nine years of observations on an
average of 490 ﬁrms a year. After exclusion of a few ﬁrms whose fore-
casted earnings were negative, the ﬁnal data set contains 4,359 ﬁrm-year
observations, 3,335 of which come from ﬁrms with active DB plans. 
The equation the authors use for estimation is based on the residual
income model, according to which a ﬁrm’s market equity value equals its
book equity value plus the present value of its expected abnormal earn-
ings, deﬁned as earnings in excess of the ﬁrm’s cost of equity capital.
Under simplifying assumptions about abnormal earnings, this reduces to a
linear equation relating price to book value and earnings per share, with
the coefﬁcients on the two explanatory variables reﬂecting their expected
time path—for instance, ﬁrms that are expected to grow rapidly have
higher coefﬁcients on current earnings. The authors adapt this model for
their purposes by separating both a ﬁrm’s book value and its earnings into
a pension fund component and a residual representing the ﬁrm’s core
activity. In making this separation, they treat the accrual of new pension
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equals the NPPC as deﬁned by FAS 87 less this service cost component.
Core book value is the ﬁrm’s book value less its net pension assets. 
If markets respond as predicted by the transparent model, a ﬁrm’s
stock price will be explained by its core book value, its core earnings, and
the net assets of the pension fund, all on a per-share basis. Pension earn-
ings per share will not enter. If instead markets respond as predicted by
the opaque model, pension earnings per share becomes an explanatory
variable, and pension fund net assets will not enter. The authors estimate
alternative speciﬁcations that allow the data to determine what markets in
fact respond to. In addition to the key variables that they test for, all their
pooled time-series regressions include time dummy variables and ana-
lysts’ growth forecasts as well as dummy variables for ﬁrms that have DB
plans. With pension earnings omitted from the regression, net pension
assets has a statistically signiﬁcant coefﬁcient of 0.76, which is within the
range predicted by the transparent model once allowance is made for tax
effects. However, when one adds pension earnings, this variable is
strongly signiﬁcant and leaves no role for pension assets in the regression.
This ﬁnding is robust to a range of speciﬁcations and signiﬁcance tests
and thus clearly supports the opaque model. It is also supported in sepa-
rate cross-sectional regressions for each of the nine years. Only in 1998
does net pension assets replace pension earnings as the signiﬁcant
explanatory variable. Most notably, in 2000 and 2001, when the discrep-
ancies between pension earnings and net pension assets were at their
widest, pension earnings dominates the regressions, and the coefﬁcients
on pension assets are insigniﬁcant (and have the wrong sign). 
The other main ﬁnding is that the effects of pension earnings on stock
price are indistinguishable from the effects of core earnings. Across a
range of speciﬁcations, the coefﬁcients on both are estimated quite pre-
cisely and with no signiﬁcant difference between them. The authors note
that this ﬁnding is subject to alternative explanations. Investors may sim-
ply look at total earnings and not the composition of earnings. Or they
may separately value the contributions of core and pension earnings, and
the similar coefﬁcients on the two reﬂect the average of their sample. To
distinguish between these two explanations, the authors divide their sam-
ple of ﬁrms with DB plans into those with high and low median price-
earnings ratios and estimate a ﬁxed effects model on the two groups. They
ﬁnd higher coefﬁcients on both core and pension earnings for the ﬁrms
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total earnings and do not distinguish between their optimistic view of the
ﬁrm’s prospects and the prospects of its pension fund. 
These results are conﬁrmed by regressions based on a dividend dis-
count model as an alternative to the basic stock price model used in the
paper. For estimation purposes, the authors modify the dividend discount
model to allow for different valuations on core and pension earnings by
regressing the logarithm of the ratio of price to core earnings on the loga-
rithm of the ratio of the ﬁrm’s total earnings to core earnings, its dividend
payout rate, and its long-run growth rate, along with the logarithm of ﬁrm
assets (to capture the effect of ﬁrm size) and a dummy variable for
whether a ﬁrm has a DB plan. The hypothesis that pension and core earn-
ings are valued equally predicts that the logarithm of the ratio of total
earnings to core earnings will have a coefﬁcient of 1.0. When this variable
is dated one year ahead, the coefﬁcient is indeed not statistically different
from 1.0, and under other speciﬁcations the authors present, including one
with ﬁxed ﬁrm effects, the coefﬁcient is above 1.0. 
Finally, the authors estimate how much ﬁrm values were inﬂated dur-
ing the sample period as a consequence of investors’ valuing pension
earnings rather than pension net assets, the transparent measure that the
authors regard as more meaningful. Using the model just described, they
ﬁrst calculate predicted price-earnings ratios for each ﬁrm in each year
and then calculate the contribution to price made by pension earnings on
the assumption that these earnings are valued the same as core earnings.
They then estimate each ﬁrm’s overvaluation as the difference between
this contribution from the pension plan to the stock price and the contri-
bution predicted by the transparent model that is based on pension net
asset values. By this criterion they ﬁnd that the average ﬁrm with a DB
plan is overvalued in each year of their sample, but usually by only a few
percentage points. Not surprisingly, however, the overvaluation rises
sharply in 2001. In this last year of their sample, the authors estimate that
the average ﬁrm was 10 percent overvalued and that 10 percent of ﬁrms
were at least 20 percent overvalued. These overvaluations presumably
grew in 2002. But if stock prices continue to recover, they can be
expected to switch to undervaluations as the low stock prices of the recent
past continue to depress net pension earnings.
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